Sony TV: Japanese “Soul,” Chinese “Body”: Sony recently handed effective control of its TV business to TCL, marking the endpoint of a 15‑year structural shift from Japanese to Chinese TV manufacturing. The move signals the end of the “Japanese precision” era in the TV market.
Samsung: The Last Titan: With Sony stepping back, Samsung remains the only major non‑Chinese global TV champion. But it faces growing pressure: shrinking supply options, the need to buy panels from rivals, and price/performance challenges from Chinese Mini‑LED.
TCL: Hardware + Software + Audience: TCL combines upstream panel scale (CSOT), a Google TV‑first OS (better UX, lower R&D cost) and gamer‑centric features (144Hz, low input lag). That integrated strategy compresses costs, narrows premium differentiation, wins younger buyers, and threatens incumbents’ share and margins.
The “Currys” Test
Walking into a Currys or John Lewis and shoppers may see two 75‑inch TVs side by side:
- Sony Bravia: £1,499. Sales pitch: “Japanese precision” and “cinema quality.”
- TCL: £899. Sales pitch: “Budget option.”
Shoppers assume the £600 premium buys better hardware, quality, and longevity. In reality, both are likely built around the same Chinese display panels. That £600 gap is largely a brand premium: a “logo tax.”
The “Bravia” Surrender
Sony stopped making TV panels years ago and has long sourced them from Chinese and Korean suppliers, focusing instead on image‑processing and system integration.
As Sony’s global TV share slid below 2%, scale and margin pressures pushed the company to pivot towards higher‑margin businesses such as gaming, music, film, and anime.
In response, Sony recently formed a joint venture with TCL (51% TCL / 49% Sony) to transfer control of its TV business to TCL. The JV targets starting operations in April 2027.
What the JV means: Sony effectively “licenses” its brand equity and image‑processing capability, while TCL brings panel and manufacturing scale. Product lines will likely combine TCL’s hardware with Sony’s chips and tuning.
For consumers, the practical difference between premium and budget models will narrow as vertically integrated Chinese manufacturers supply the core components.
For Sony, the move is a strategic retreat to focus on content and entertainment while retaining a branded presence in TVs.
TCL’s upside: TCL gains a premium global brand and Sony’s video processing know‑how, accelerating its climb up the value chain.
The JV strengthens TCL’s position to challenge incumbents such as Samsung in mid‑to‑high segment, reshaping competitive dynamics in global TV markets.
The Timeline of Surrender
The Sony–TCL deal is the final chapter in a 15‑year shift in which Koean and Japanese TV makers have ceded manufacturing and scale to rising Chinese players.
- 2009: Pioneer discontinued the legendary “Kuro” plasma line, as it was unable to justify costs vs cheaper LCDs.
- 2012–2014: Hitachi and Philips exited manufacturing and licensed their TV brands to Chinese OEMs.
- 2016: Sharp, long regarded as an LCD pioneer, was acquired by Foxconn (Hon Hai).
- 2017: Toshiba sold its TV unit to Hisense, handing a 40‑year legacy to a Chinese challenger.
- 2022: Samsung Display closed its last LCD factory to focus on OLED, leaving Samsung’s low-to-mid end TV models reliant on external panel suppliers.
- 2026: TCL acquired LG Display’s Guangzhou LCD plant, boosting Chinese panel capacity.
- 2026: Sony spun off its TV business into a joint venture with TCL, where TCL holds a 51% controlling stake.
TCL: The Two-Headed Dragon
TCL ranked No. 2 globally in terms of TV shipments, behind Samsung with 16% market share.
The historical gap has narrowed substantially. In 2015 Samsung shipped about four times as many units as TCL. By late 2025, the difference had materially compressed. In several regions, including Eastern Europe and the Middle East & Africa, TCL already leads in volume. We expect a global leadership flip to be likely in 2026–2027.
TCL’s dual structure: Kitchen vs Restaurant
The Kitchen — TCL Technology (000100.SZ)
- Focus: upstream manufacturing for semiconductors, display materials, and photovoltaic modules.
- Asset base: CSOT (China Star Optoelectronics Technology) panel fabs and other upstream capacity.
- Role: supplies panels (and related components) to TV brands, including third parties. The recent acquisition of LG Display’s China LCD plant in early 2026 increases scale and lowers unit costs.
- Investment character: a commodity‑cyclical industrial play exposed to capex cycles and panel pricing.
The Restaurant — TCL Electronics (1070.HK)
- Focus: downstream consumer products and branding.
- Role: Assembles TVs using panels from the kitchen, manages distribution, and markets under TCL (and Sony/BRAVIA under JV arrangements).
- Advantage: Tight upstream affiliation with CSOT secures supply, compresses cost, and allows aggressive pricing and faster product rollouts.
Rise of the Chinese bloc in the global TV market
The global TV market has shifted materially over the past decade, driven by consolidation of supply, faster Chinese scale-up, and changing technology mixes.
The collapse of the old guard
- LG: Dominates OLED with over 50% share, but its overall unit volume has declined. LG’s OLED strength does not translate well to the mass‑market LCD/Mini‑LED segments where Chinese competitors compete aggressively on price and scale.
- Sony: Market share has fallen from roughly 5% a decade ago to under 2% currently. The joint venture with TCL appears to be Sony’s de‑risking and exit path from a manufacturing model that no longer delivers scale or margins.
The rise of the Chinese bloc
- Rapid share gains: The combined shipment share of TCL and Hisense rose from about 11% in 2015 to roughly 26% currently, closing the gap on the Korean bloc (Samsung and LG).
- Structural advantages: Chinese players benefit from vertically integrated supply chains (panel fabs, backlights, modules), lower cost structures, aggressive capex, and tight upstream‑downstream coordination that compresses unit costs and accelerates product rollout.
Samsung : The Last Titan
With Sony effectively exiting TV manufacturing, Samsung stands as the last major non‑Chinese global TV player. Having said that, it is facing intensifying pressure from Chinese rivals such as TCL and Hisense.
- Global share dynamics: TCL has overtaken LG to become the No. 2 TV shipper and is closing the gap with Samsung, driven by aggressive expansion in Europe and MEA and strength in mini‑LED. Korean brands are losing share in many regions.
- Panel supply vulnerability: After Samsung exited LCD panel manufacturing in 2022, it no longer owns a broad LCD supply base. For mid‑range models, it must source panels from suppliers such as TCL/CSOT, effectively financing its key competitor and exposing Samsung to supply‑chain and margin risk.
- Flagship tech under attack: Samsung’s OLED delivers superior “perfect black” performance but at a significantly higher cost, especially above 77 inches, where OLED pricing rises sharply. TCL’s mini‑LED implementations now approximate OLED picture quality at a fraction of the price, eroding Samsung’s premium advantage, especially in the growing super‑large TV segment (>75 inches).
The “OS” War
Beyond hardware, software strategy has become a decisive battleground. Samsung and LG double down on proprietary ecosystems, while TCL embraces a different path with Google TV.
Samsung / LG — the “walled‑garden” strategy
- Objective: Own the OS (Tizen, webOS) to capture user traffic, ad revenue, and service monetisation.
- Tradeoff: Proprietary UIs are often cluttered, include intrusive or unskippable ads, and require heavy in‑house R&D to keep up with platform features and developer ecosystems.
TCL — the “Android” strategy
- Objective: Adopt Google TV as the native OS rather than build and maintain a proprietary platform.
- Advantage: Saves software R&D and maintenance costs, provides consumers a familiar, well‑supported interface, and delivers faster access to apps and features that users actually want.
- Outcome: TCL delivers a cleaner, faster, and more intuitive TV experience that often outperforms many “premium” Korean models on UX metrics.
In our view, proprietary ecosystems might offer monetisation upside, but in practice many consumers prefer the simplicity and breadth of a Google TV‑based experience and favour brands that adopt open, familiar platforms.
Capturing the “Console Generation”
Traditional TV brands prioritise “cinema fidelity” — perfect skin tones, director’s intent and deep blacks. TCL targets a different, fast‑growing segment: console gamers.
- Feature gap: Historically, features like 144Hz and Variable Refresh Rate (VRR) were reserved for flagship TVs, limiting high‑refresh gaming to premium buyers.
- Democratization of gaming tech: TCL pushed 144Hz VRR and low input‑lag into mid‑range models, making pro‑level console performance accessible to mass markets.
- Demand shift: Younger buyers prioritise responsiveness and frame rate over subtle film grading. By optimising for input lag, refresh rate, and game modes, TCL aligned product design with this demographic’s needs.
As a result, TCL captured an expanding group of buyers who value gaming performance. Offering gamer‑centric features at competitive prices differentiates TCL from legacy premium brands still focused on cinematic picture tuning, helping TCL win both market share and brand loyalty among the next generation of TV purchasers.
The Geopolitical Hedge: Global Production
TCL does not ship finished televisions across the world; it ships components. Key components such as panels are shipped from China to local assembly hubs overseas, where the final product is screwed together.
- For the EU & UK: The Zyrardow, Poland plant. This facility allows TCL to service the European market with inventory that qualifies as EU Origin. By shipping components and assembling locally, they bypass the import duties that plague pure-play Asian exporters.
- For the US: The Juarez, Mexico plant (MASA). TVs rolling out of this factory are stamped “Assembled in Mexico,”effectively shielding them from US-China trade war tariffs.
This article was originally published on Asia Pulse.
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